sábado, 18 de mayo de 2024
TEORÍA DE LOS VIDEOJUEGOS
Me citan (no sobre videojuegos) en este libro de teoría de los videojuegos, visible en el último enlace:
Perron, Bernard, and Mark J. P. Wolf, eds. The Video Game Theory Reader 2. New York and London: Taylor and Francis-Routledge, 2008.
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203887660/chapters/10.4324/9780203887660-12
2020
Online at Google Books:
http://books.google.es/books?id=ckKTAgAAQBAJ
2014
_____. The Video Game Theory Reader 2. New York and London: Taylor and Francis – Routledge, 2009. Reissued, Routledge eBooks, 2013. Online at Academia.*
https://www.academia.edu/119098463/
2024
Por esos parajes no me adentro...
Lo citado es mi artículo sobre la espiral hermenéutica:
_____. "Tematización retroactiva, interacción e interpretación: La espiral hermenéutica de Schleiermacher a Goffman." iPaper at Academia.edu 17 June 2011.*
https://www.academia.edu/633413/
2015
—oOo—
viernes, 17 de mayo de 2024
Ocultismo y Satanismo de la Élite Globalista
Is Occult Belief among Elites a Real Thing? https://t.co/7Cmiv2kl56
— Dr Naomi Wolf (@naomirwolf) May 17, 2024
Atrocious Crimes by the Authorities
German member of European Parliament Christine Anderson says that the rollout of the mRNA vaccines will be known as the “biggest crime to ever have been committed on mankind.” pic.twitter.com/1DHaQ1g4ro
— DiedSuddenly (@DiedSuddenly_) May 17, 2024
Mangiaracina, Emily. "Japan's Most Senior Cancer Doctor: Covid Shots Are 'Essentially Murder'." Life Site News 14 May 2024.* (Masanori Fukushima).
2024
The Origins of Modern Human Cognition
Tattersall, Ian. "The Origins of Modern Human Cognition." Video. Lecture at the Institute of Human Origins, NY 2023. YouTube (ASU Institute of Human Origins) 8 Dec. 2023.*
2024
—oOo—
Retropost, 2014: La Peine Maximum (2) bisbiseo
No el delito mayor, sino la condena máxima. Una
canción que cantaba Josué en el musical Les Dix Commandements: La
peine maximum.
O el mayor dolor. Bastante causa ha tenido / Vuestra justicia y rigor.
—oOo—
—oOo—
The Social Brain: culture, change and evolution | Bret Weinstein
Weinstein, Bret. "The Social Brain: culture, change and evolution." Video. YouTube (Big Think) 5 Feb. 2018.* (Beliefs, Environment, Global crisis, Sustainability, Competition, Firms, Capitalism, Market, Google, Regulations).
2024
—oOo—
jueves, 16 de mayo de 2024
Los duendes Lang y Lit
Según J.R.R. Tolkien:
Todos los campos de estudio e investigación, todas las grandes Escuelas, requieren sacrificio humano. Porque su objetivo principal no es la cultura, y su utilidad académica no se limita a la educación. Sus raíces se hunden en el deseo de saber, y su vida es mantenida por quienes persiguen cierto amor o curiosidad por sí mismos, sin referencia siquiera al progreso personal. Si este amor y curiosidad individuales fracasan, su tradición se hace esclerótica.
Por tanto, no hay necesidad de menospreciar, ni siquiera de sentir lástima, por los meses o años de vida sacrificados a cualquier investigación mínima: por ejemplo, al estudio de cierto texto medieval insulso y su balbuciente dialecto, o de algún miserable poetastro “moderno” y su vida (espantosa, aburrida, y afortunadamente, corta)… NO, SI el sacrificio es voluntario, y SI está inspirado por una genuina curiosidad, sentida de manera espontánea o personal.
Pero concedido eso, se debe sentir un grave desasosiego cuando falta la inspiración legítima; cuando la materia o asunto de “investigación” viene impuesto, o es “sacado” del saco de curiosidades de otro para un aspirante, o es considerado por un comité como ejercicio suficiente para obtener un título académico. Sea lo que haya resultado útil en otras esferas, hay una gran diferencia entre aceptar el trabajo espontáneo de muchas personas humildes para construir una casa inglesa y levantar una pirámide con el sudor de esclavos de la graduación.
Pero la cuestión no es, desde luego, tan simple. No se trata sólo de la degeneración de la auténtica curiosidad y entusiasmo en una “economía planificada”, bajo la cual gran parte del tiempo de investigación se embute de cualquier modo en pellejos más o menos normalizados, convertido en salchichas de tamaño y forma aprobados por nuestro mezquino libro de recetas propias. Aun cuando eso fuera una descripción suficiente del sistema, vacilaría antes de acusar a nadie de hacerlo premeditadamente o de aprobarlo con entusiasmo ahora que lo hemos conseguido. Ha crecido, en parte por accidente, en parte a causa de la acumulación de expedientes provisionales. Se ha invertido mucha reflexión en ello, y se ha dedicado mucho trabajo entregado y mal remunerado a administrarlo y a mitigar sus males. (…)
En tal estado de cosas, la divergencia de intereses, o al menos de pericia, es inevitable. Pero no se ha hecho nada para salvar las dificultades—antes bien, se han agravado—causadas por la aparición de dos figuras legendarias, los duendes Lang y Lit. Así prefiero llamarlos, ya que las palabras lengua y literatura, aunque por lo general mal utilizadas entre nosotros, no deben ser degradadas de ese modo. La mitología popular parece creer que Lang salió de un huevo de cuco dejado en el nido, en el que ocupa demasiado lugar y roba los gusanos del pollo Lit. Algunos creen que Lit fue el cuco, empeñado en echar fuera a su compañero de nido, o en sentarse sobre él; y ellos gozan de más apoyo gracias a la historia real de nuestra Escuela. Pero tampoco ese cuento está bien fundado. (…)
Lengua y Literatura aparecen como “partes” de una disciplina. Eso era bastante inofensivo, e incluso cierto, al menos mientras “partes” signifique, como debiera, aspectos y énfasis, que, puesto que tenían “igual importancia” en la disciplina como un todo, ni eran exclusivas, ni propiedad de este o aquel especialista, ni tampoco el objeto único de un curso de estudio.
Pero, ¡ay!, “partes” sugería “partidos”, y muchos tomaron partido. Y de ese modo, salieron a escena Lang y Lit, los compañeros de nido enfrentados, cada uno tratando de acaparar más tiempo de los aspirantes, sin importar lo que los aspirantes pudieran pensar. (…).
Cuando el inglés y su parentela se convirtieron en mi trabajo, me dediqué a otras lenguas, incluso al latín y al griego; y le tomé gusto a Lit tan pronto como me puse del lado de Lang. Efectivamente, me uní al bando de Lang, y descubrí que la brecha entre partidos era ya enorme; y a menos que recuerde mal, continúo ensanchándose durante algún tiempo. Cuando volví de Leeds en 1925, NOSOTROS ya no significaba estudiantes de inglés, significaba partidarios de Lang o de Lit. ELLOS significaba todos aquellos que estaban en el otro bando: gente de infinita astucia, que había que vigilar constantemente, no fuera a ser que NOS derrocaran. Y… ¡los muy canallas lo consiguieron!
Porque si ustedes disponen de Partes con etiquetas, obtendrán Partidismos. Las luchas entre facciones, desde luego, son con frecuencia divertidas, en especial para los de ánimo belicoso; pero no está claro que hagan ningún bien; no son mejores en Oxford que en Verona. Tal vez las cosas les hayan parecido a algunos más aburridas en el largo período durante el que la hostilidad estuvo adormecida; y a los tales todo les podría parecer más animado si se reavivaran los rescoldos. Espero que no suceda. Habría sido mejor que nunca se hubiesen encendido.
La supresión del malentendido de los términos puede producir en ocasiones amistad. Así que, aunque el tiempo que queda es breve, consideraré ahora el mal empleo de lengua y literatura en nuestra Escuela. Creo que el error inicial se cometió cuando The School of English Language and Literature se adoptó como nuestro nombre. Los que la aman la llaman la School of English o la English School—en donde, si se me permite introducir una puntualización de Lang, la palabra English no es adjetivo, sino un nombre en composición libre—. . . .
… creo que fue un error incluir Lengua dentro de nuestro nombre para señalar esta diferencia, o para poner sobre aviso a los que ignoran su propia ignorancia. No menos porque a Lengua se le da así, como además sospecho que fue la intención, un sentido artificialmente limitado y seudotécnico que separa este asunto técnico de la Literatura. Tal separación es falsa, y este empleo del vocablo “lengua”, también.
El sentido correcto y natural de Lengua incluye Literatura, del mismo modo que Literatura incluye el estudio del lenguaje de las obras literarias. Litteratura, que procedía del significado elemental “grupo de letras; alfabeto”, se empleaba como equivalente de los términos griegos grammatike y philologia: es decir, el estudio de la gramática y del idioma, así como el estudio crítico de los autores (enormemente preocupados por el lenguaje). Esas cosas que todavía debería incluir siempre. Pero aun cuando algunos deseen ahora utilizar la palabra “literatura” en un marco más restringido, para referirse al estudio de escritos que poseen una intención o una forma artísticas, con tan poca referencia como sea posible a la grammatike o a la philologia, ésta su “literatura” sigue siendo una función de la Lengua. Puede ser que la Literatura sea la operación o función más elevada de la Lengua, pero no obstante, es Lengua. (…)
Yo nací en [Sudáfrica], aunque no reclamo ser el más erudito de los que han venido aquí desde el extremo más lejano del Continente Negro. Pero llevo el odio al apartheid en los huesos; y detesto por encima de todo la segregación o separación entre Lengua y Literatura. No importa a cuál de los dos consideren el Blanco.
(J. R. R. Tolkien, “Discurso de despedida a la Universidad de Oxford,” 5 de junio de 1959. En Los monstruos y los críticos, Barcelona: Minotauro/Planeta DeAgostini, 2002)
—oOo—
miércoles, 15 de mayo de 2024
martes, 14 de mayo de 2024
Dos prólogos a 'Frankenstein'
Notas (tomadas en 2007) sobre el prólogo del editor y la introducción de la autora de Frankenstein. Edición usada:
Mary Shelley. Frankenstein. Ed. M. K. Joseph. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1969. (World's Classics ed., 1980).
Introduction (by M. K. Joseph).
The Prometheus myth is a basic clue to the meaning of Frankenstein. 2 myths: Prometheus pyrphoros and Prometheus plasticator, mixed since late Antiquity. The theme was being worked on by Byron and Shelley at the time Mary Shelley wrote the novel. Theories of galvanism, Erasmus Darwin, H. Davy, Volta... and Shaftesbury's Characteristicks, on the possibility of creating a human being, use of Prometheus myth.
3 concentric layer structure. (En realidad 4 capas concéntricas, pues el prefacio de Mary Shelley se ha vuelto parte de la novela (véase por ej. la versión de Gonzalo Suárez, Remando al viento), y las extrañas conexiones críticas con el libro desarrolladas tanto por la misma M. Shelley como por los comentadores, que la suelen mostrar como la que roba el fuego de la inspiración de los poetas).
Parallelism between Walton and Frankenstein: Faustian hybris in both. Cautionary tale vs. the science which takes men away from normal society. Echo of The Ancient Mariner. Parallelism Mer de Glace (Alps) / the North Pole. The Monster's narrative: a Godwinian Genesis.
Improbabilities and contrivances: the cottage, Safie, the journal. Paradise Lost offers a double parallel (Adam/Satan) for the Monster. He demands his Eve; "we are drawn to complete the equation for ourselves: as the monster is to Frankenstein, so perhaps is Frankenstein to whatever power created man. The clue to the monster's predicament—benevolence corrupted—may also be the clue to Frankenstein's" (xi).
The Monster becomes a doppelgänger or a Mr Hyde. Only at end the story is proved not to be an hallucination. "Yet the monster is, in a literal sense, a projection of Frankenstein's mind, and an embodiment of his guilt in withdrawing from his kind and pursuing knowledge which, though not forbidden, is still dangerous." (xi). The epigraph applies to both. (Y a Mary Shelley también). Frankenstein's sin vs. Godwinian social benevolence, influenced by Perby Bysshe Shelley's Alastor, or the Spirit of Solitude.
Writing at the start of scientific revolution: Prometheanism is applied by Mary Shelley to science, not art —a great move. The novel creates a lasting symbol of the perils of scientific Prometheanism, it has become independent myth, giving rise to films, etc., "It is ironic but entirely appropriate that, in the process, the nameless monster seems to have usurped the name of his creator" (xiii).
Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus (1818)
Epigraph from Paradise Lost. (Y sigue inmediatamente la dedicatoria a William Godwin, su padre; hay pues dos "makers"; "to mould Me man", irónico en una mujer autora, ¿clave genérica para la novela como travestismo?)
Introduction (de Mary Shelley, en retrospección, escrita en 1831).
(Se oye una voz nueva, nueva relación del autor con la invención y la imaginación. Lo presenta como parte de su vida interior, sólo con dificultad y límites transmitible al papel. Escribe desde niña, pero le gusta fantasear:)
"my favourite pastime, during the hours given me for recreation, was to 'write stories.' Still I had a dearer pleasure than this, which was the formation of castles in the air—the indulging in waking dreams—the following of trains of thought, which had for their subject the formation of a succession of imaginary incidents" (5) Dreams are free and original, writings are derivative, because they are going to be read by others, "but my dreams were all my own" (5).
"I did not make myself the heroine of my tales" (6) (pero sugiere un elemento de proyección que además se realiza: "I could not figure myself that romantic woes or wonderful events would ever be my lot; but I was not confined to my own identity, and I could people the hours with creations far more interesing to me at that age, than my own sensations" (6). Nota: to people, creations.
Luego se presenta a sí misma como discípula e hija intelectual de Percy Bysshe Shelley. Historia de la estancia en Suiza, historias de fantasmas alemanas que lee prefiguran temas en Frankenstein: el retorno de lo reprimido, el creador que acaba con su raza. Byron propone escribir cada uno una ghost story, pero Mary insinúa que ni la prosa ni la narración se les dan bien: "The illustrious poets also, annoyed by the platitude of prose, speedily relinquished their uncongenial task" (8) (—detecto un tono de burla?).
"I busied myself to think of a story" desea mostrar miedos misteriosos ocultos en nuestra naturaleza y asustar al lector, pero writer's block: "that blank capability of invention which is the greatest misery of authorship, when dull Nothing replies to our anxious invocations" (—¿invocar a lo oculto?).
Mary aprende de Byron y Shelley como el monstruo aprende de Paradise Lost: "Many and long were the conversations between Lord Byron and Shelley, to which I was a devout but nearly silent listener" (8). Experimentos científicos discutidos, posibilidad de crear vida, electricidad, fabricación de partes corporales "brought together, and endued with vital warmth" (9) —cf. el sueño de su hija muerta, acercado al fuego y calentado a la vida.
La noche de la conversación, "I did not sleep, nor could I be said to think. My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the successive images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the usual bounds of reverie" (9). "Ve" la imagen central de la novela, el monstruo animado "on the working of some powerful engine" (9). "Frightful it must be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world" (9). Cf. la oposición entre la auténtica vida y creación de la poesía de Byron y Shelley, por una parte, y el "mecanismo" de la prosa por otra, que ellos no consiguen crear pero Mary sí, efecto de una "Uneasy, half vital motion" quizá.
Es crucial en el prefacio el tema de Frankenstein durmiendo, paralelismo con M. Shelley: esperando a que se disuelva la fantasía, "that this thing, which had received such imperfect animation, would subside into dead matter" (9). Paralelismo monstruo / historia: Frankenstein libro, creador y monstruo son todo uno.
Pasa al presente histórico: el libro como proyección y conciencia autónoma, nos mira (como el monstruo) con "yellow, watery, but speculative eyes" (9). Enlace narrativo: "I opened mine in terror".
Pasamos al pasado verbal; busca la autora librarse de la idea, pero sólo lo puede hacer aceptándola, creando el monstruo. "I could not so easily get rid of my hideous phantom; still it haunted me" (10).
Parece chocante que hasta entonces no hubiese relacionado ese monstruo con la historia, y entonces percibe la relación. Además, anuncia orgullosamente Mary Shelley que lo que la aterroriza a ella aterrorizará a otros, y se libra de su complejo de inferioridad ante los grandes poetas: "I announced that I had thought of a story". Shelley la anima a desarrollarlo, etc.
"And now, once again, I bid my hideous progeny go forth and prosper. I have an affection for it, for it was the offspring of happy days, when death and grief were but words, which found no true echo in my heart" (10). Sugiere que para ella la novela tiene asociaciones personales con aquella época, pero no para el lector. —¡Tela! Lo importante es la semiconsciencia o deliberación con la que establece el paralelismo entre la creación del monstruo y la de la novela.
—oOo—
I CIHEL. Literatura española tardomedieval. 21/11/2023 (4): Comunicaciones
Minuto 1.16.00. Las cifras de condenados a la hoguera por la Inquisición son DISPARATADAS. Quiero decir que es un disparate del autor de la ponencia, de sus fuentes, o de los dos. (Aparte, son incoherentes en sí mismas).
—oOo—
Vuelve Leonardo
THE STOLEN ELECTION: Sworn affidavit confirms the 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections was stolen from President Trump and the American people. A Leonardo SpA Military Satellite was used to switch votes from Trump to Biden in a number of states where Biden was losing the vote totals.… pic.twitter.com/ijkoH9PXqj
— Truth Justice ™ (@SpartaJustice) November 23, 2023
THE COUP DE'TAT OF AMERICA: Italian Intelligence along with U.S. sworn testimony confirms the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election was stolen from President Trump. Satellites being controlled from Italy added votes to Biden to defeat Trump. Joe Biden is not the lawful U.S. President.… pic.twitter.com/S4d8Xzn32Y
— Truth Justice ™ (@SpartaJustice) November 9, 2023
Ahora, un momento de reflexión. Si les roban las elecciones a los americanos con un satélite italiano, imagínense qué no harán aquí con Indra, empresa que controla la mafia sociata, y que da los resultados provisionales convertidos en definitivos.
—oOo—
lunes, 13 de mayo de 2024
From Five Chapters of Expression and Meaning
Notes from:
John Searle. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979. 1985.
Introduction - Illocutionary Acts - Indirect Speech Acts - The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse - Metaphor.
Introduction
vii Question: how many ways of using language are there? (but answer need not be 'five'). 5 types.
viii Searle skips the poetic use of language, ignored;"perhaps the main theme of this collection: the relations between literal sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning".
ix "we must not confuse an analysis of illocutionary verbs with an analysis of illocutionary acts"
x On fiction (wrong approach: he ignores the hierarchy of embedded enunciations)
xi "I contend that the notion of literal meaning only has application against a background of assumptions and practices which are not themselves represented as part of literal meaning" — Theory of reference a part of general theory of Intentionality.
xii "intended meaning may include the literal meaning of the expressions he utters but is not exhausted by that literal meaning".
1. A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts
1. Classification into "certain basic categories or types".
Different types of differences between different types of illocutionary acts.
2. Illocutions as a part of language in general, not of specific languages (vs. illoc. verbs). Differences in point (or purpose) of the (type of) act provide the best basis for a taxonomy.
3. "The point or purpose of a type of illocution I shall call its illocutionary point". Another: "differences in the direction of fit between words and the world" (Searle ignores fiction here, but that would be word to world direction of fit, I guess).
4. Differences in expressed psychological states.
5. Differences in the force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented (suggest vs. insist, etc.). Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance.
6. Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer. (Searle analiza mal "boast," no lo ve como un efecto de la interpretación y valoración del oyente).
Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse (replies, conclusions)... Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary force indicating devices (report vs. prediction...).
Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts and those that can be, but need not be performed as speech acts.
7. Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not. Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not.
8. Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act (announcing vs. confiding) (Vague. 12 tipos en total).
9. Weaknesses in Austin's taxonomy. It is a taxonomy of verbs, not of acts.
10. "There is no clear or consistent principle or set of principles on the basis of which the taxonomy [Austin's] is constructed."
11. Overlaps, inconsistencies...
12. Pro basing classification on point, direction of fit and sincerity conditions.
ASSERTIVES. (usa simbolización lógica, etc.)
13. "The simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false." DIRECTIVES
14. COMMISSIVES
15. EXPRESSIVES
16. DECLARATIONS, where
17. "there is no surface sytactical distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force."
18. "Any utterance will consist in performing one or more illocutionary acts." "The performance of a declaration brings about a fit by its very successful performance" (& "I apologize?") No lie is possible in performing them (??? - not right).
20. Some syntactical aspects of the classification. (etc.).
27. Conclusions: "Many of the verbs we call illocutionary verbs are not markers of illocutionary point but of some other feature of the illocutionary act."
28. "Paradoxical as it may sound, such verbs are illocutionary verbs, but not names of kinds of illocutionary acts." etc.
29. vs. illusion of the indefiniteness of language games., limited number of points (5 types).
2. Indirect Speech Acts
30 "The simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such cases the speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer, and he intends to produce this effect by getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce it, and he intends to get the hearer to recognize this intention in virtue of the hearer's knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the sentence."
But sometimes "a sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of illocutionary act can be uttered to perform, in addition, another type of illocutionary act."
31. "indirect speech acts, cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another. / The problem posed by indirect speech acts is the problem of how is it possible or the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else."
31-32. "In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer." (Speech Act Theory + Grice + background + inferences).
33 the primary act is performed by way of performing a secondary illocutionary act.
34. (Implicitly uses the notion of Cooperative Principle).
36. Politeness as main motivation for indirectness in directives.
Some Sentences "Conventionally" Used in the Performance of Indirect Directives. Can you ... etc.
39. Some Putative Facts. "Fact 1: The sentences in question do not have an imperative force as part of their meaning."
40. Fact 2. not ambiguous. Fact 3. Conventionally used to issue directives. Fact 4. Not idioms.
41. Fact 5. But they are idiomatic. Fact 6. "The sentences in quiestion have literal utterances in which they are not also indirect requests."
42. Fact 7. "In cases where these sentences are uttered as requests, they still have their literal meaning and are uttered with and as having that literal meaning."
43. Fact 8. When used to perform an indirect, the literal act is also performed (question, etc.).
An Explanation in Terms of the Theory of Speech Acts. (With preparatory condition, sincerity condition, propositional content condition and essential condition). Etc.
48 Some problems—
Solved by appeal to the conventional nature of this use, the maxim of (50) "Speak idiomatically unless there is some speacial reason not to".
54. Extending the analysis to other acts than directives.
56. Searle's solution beyond the paradigms of both linguists (structural rules) and philosophers of language (logic conditions). Toward cognitivism, beyond assumption of explaining everything through axioms and syntactical rules. (knowledge of the world, inferences).
3. The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse
58. Distinction fiction/literature.
59. Here, logical status of fiction, not of literature (which is not possible):
"First, there is no trait or set of traits which all works of literature have in common and which could constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a work of literature. Literature, to use Wittgenstein's terminology, is a family-resemblance notion".
Literature is a set of attitudes we take towards a stretch of discourse, not properties of that stretch (not arbitrary, though). "Roughly speaking, whether or not a work is literature is for the readers to decide, whether or not it is fiction is for the author to decide."
(Searle tiene una noción evaluativa-laudatoria de la literatura).
60. Distinction between fictional speech and figurative speech. "let us say that metaporical uses of expressions are 'nonliteral' and that fictional utterances are 'nonserious'."
62. Analysis: essential rules, preparatory rules, expressed proposition, sincerity rule... fiction does not fulfil any of the rules for assertions. Shanahan (report) vs. Iris Murdoch (novel):
63 "what kind of illocutionary act can Miss Murdoch be performing?" (La respuesta no es para Searle ni escribir una novela ni escribir ficción). Vs. saying that he is performing the illocutionary act of telling a story or writing a novel. "On this theory, newspaper accounts contain one class of illocutionary acts (statements, assertions, descriptions, explanations) and fictional literature contains another class of illocutionary acts (writing stories, novels, poems, plays, etc.)." (NO: no se sigue una cosa de la otra en absoluto. Inconsistencia lógica. Searle no aplica macro-actos al discurso ordinario, ni micro-actos a la estructura interna de la ficción).
64. "In general the illocutionary act (or acts) performed in the utterance of the sentence is a function of the meaning of the sentence." (Ni siquiera entra en si la ficción es un acto ilocucionario definido, sólo rechaza que la ficción contenga actos distintos de la no ficción. Pero no es ése el problema). Murdoch is not asserting:
65. "She is pretending, one could say, to make an assertion." —Etc."to engage in a performance which is as if one were doing or being the thing and is without any intent to deceive" (¿Y esto no es una ilocución? No está claro lo que piensa Searle:)
65-66: "The identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author. There is no textual property, syntactical or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction. What makes it a work of fiction is, so to speak, the illocutionary stnace that the author takes toward it, and that stance is a matter of the complex illocutionary intentions that the author has when he writes or otherwise composes it."
66. Vs. extremes of anti-intentionalism: "at the most basic level it is absurd to suppose a critic can completely ignore the intentions of the author, since even so much as to identify a text as a novel, a poem or even as a text is already to make a claim about the author's intentions." "What makes fiction possible, I suggest, is a set of extralinguistic, nonsemantic conventions that break the connection between words and the world established by the rules mentioned earlier" (Es decir, convenciones pragmáticas. Pero Searle no usa el término).
67. "In this sense, to use Wittgenstein's jargon, telling stories really is a separate language game; to be played it requires a separate set of conventions, though these conventions are not meaning rules; and the language game is not on all fours with illocutionary language games, but is parasitic on them." (Tiene que decir esto Searle porque concibe las ilocuciones como una sucesión de actos simples, no como una jerarquía. Ficción como language game, pero no es una ilocución para él - JAGL).
68. "The utterance acts in fiction are indistinguishable from the utterance acts of serious discourse, and it is for that reason that there is no textual property tht will identify a stretch of discourse as a work of fiction. It is the performance of the utterance act with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions that constitutes the pretended performance of the illocutionary act." (Wrong. An institutionalized illocutionary act is performed, and not only through intention - JAGL). "The pretended performance of illocutionary acts which constitute the writing of a work of fiction consists in actually performing utterance acts with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions that suspend the normal illocutionary commitments of the utterances". (Pero cómo se reconoce esa intención?).
69. "in first-person narratives, the author often pretends to be someone else making assertions" (por qué no "quotes somebody"?)
Drama: It does not consist of assertions but of directions on how to perform the play.
III. 71. Murdoch "does not really refer to a fictional character because there was no such antecedently existing character; rather, by pretending torefer to a person (72) she creates a fictional person." (NO: Searle usa un sentido demasiado literalista de 'referencia'). Real reference exists, to existing places, etc.
73. "By pretending to refer to people and to recount events about them, the author creates fictional characters and events."
74. "A work of fiction need not consist entirely of, and in general will not consist entirely of, fictional discourse."
IV. Crucial role of imagination in life, source of importance we give to pretended speech acts. Messages conveyed by the text but not in the text.
75."but there is as yet no general theory of the mechanisms by which such serious illocutionary intentions are conveyed by pretended illocutions."
4. Metaphor
76. Metaphor is a special case of “how it is possible to say one thing and mean something else”.
77. Other cases: irony and indirect speech acts. Metaphorical meaning involves the speaker’s intentions. “Metaphorical meaning is always speaker’s utterance meaning.”
78. Beyond a theory of semantic competence. Vs. assuming that we already know how literal utterances work, as metaph. theorists do.
80. “Thus, even in literal utterances, where speaker’s meaning coincides with sentence meaning, the speaker must contribute more to the literal utterance thatn just the semantic content of the sentence...”
81. Need to distinguish metaphor not just from literal utterance, but from other forms “in which literal utterance is departed from or exceeded, in some way.”
84. “In the case of literal utterance, speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning are the same.”
85. Metaphor’s basic principle: “the utterance of an expression with its literal meaning and corresponding truth conditions can, in various ways that are specific to metaphor, call to mind another meaning and corresponding set of truth conditions.”
86. “the endemic vice of the comparison theories is that they fail to distinguish between the claim that the statement of the comparison is part of the meaning, and hence the truth conditions of the metaphorical statement, and the claim that the statement of the similarity is the principle of inference, or a step in the process of comprehending, on the basis of which speakers produce and hearers understand metaphor.”
Semantic interaction theories: “Their endemic vice is the failure to appreciate the distinction between sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical, and speaker or utterance meaning, which can be metaphorical. They usually try to locate metaphorical meaning in the sentence or some set of associations with the sentence.
87. No change in the meaning of the words: but “the speaker means something different by them”
88. “the metaphorical assertion is not necessarily an assertion of similarity. Similarity .. . has to do with the production and understanding of metaphor, not with its meaning.”
91. “One of the assumptions behind the view that metaphorical meaning is a result of an interaction between an expression used metaphorically and other expressions used literally is that all metaphorical uses of expressions must occur in sentences containing literal uses of expressions, and that assumption seems to me plainly false. It is, incidentally, the assumption behnd the terminology of many of the contemporary discussions of metaphor” (I. A. Richards, etc).
92. “It is not in general the case that the metaphorical speaker’s meaning is a result of any interaction among the elements of a sentence in any literal sense of ‘interaction’.”
94. Vs. metaphor as a shortened version of the literal simile.
102. “Similarity does not in general function as part of the truth conditions. . .; rather, when it functions, it functions as a strategy for interpretation.” Even then,
103. “the simile theory does not tell us how to compute the respects of similarity or which similarities are metaphorically intended by the speaker.”
Basic question: “HOw is it possible for the speaker to say metaphorically ‘S is P’ and mean “S is R’, when P plainly does not mean R?” 104. “I believe that there is no single principle on which metaphor works.” Strategies:
105. “Where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning.” And a series of additional principles.
110. Principle 8. “According to my account of metaphor, it becomes a matter of terminology whether we want to construe metonymy and synecdoche as special cases of metaphor or as independent tropes.”
111. “Since the principles of metaphor are rather various anyway, I am inclined to treat metonymy and synecdoche as special cases of metaphor and add their principles to my list of metaphorical principles.”
112. Shared strategies to recognize non-literalness, shared principles to associate possible values, and shared strategies to restrict the range of possible values to the actual one.
113. “irony, like metaphor, does not require any conventions, extralinguistic or otherwise. The principles of conversation and the general rules for performing speech acts are sufficient to provide the basic principles of irony.” “In the indirect speech act, the speaker means what he says. However, in addition, he means something more. Sentence meaning is a part of utterance meaning, but it does not exhaust utterance meaning.”
114. ‘It follows trivially from the Principle of Expressibility . . . that any meaning whatever can be given an exact expression in the language.”
—oOo—
Other chapters:
5. Literal Meaning.
6. Referential and Attributive
7. Speech Acts and Recent Linguistics.
—oOo—
CATALUÑA: GANA LO PEOR DE CADA CASA
Éste Aitor da a entender que los abstencionistas son unos ilustrados. Muy al contrario: son ellos los que aúpan los resultados obtenidos, por la vía de no oponerse a ellos.
Olvídate de mí
González, Juanma, and Dani Palacios. "Olvídate de mí: Dudas razonables sobre la película más aclamada y peor titulada de los 2000." Audio. (Par-Impar). EsRadio 20 May 2024.*
2024
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domingo, 12 de mayo de 2024
Richard McElreath - The Problem with Cultural Evolution
McElreath, Richard. (MPI-EVA Leipzig). "The Problem with Cultural Evolution." Video lecture. YouTube (UCLABEC) 4 April 2023.* (Models, Method, Data, Inferences).
2021
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Expediente Royuela: Bibliografía
Bibliografía que hice sobre el Expediente Royuela, a la altura de 2021, y que ha ido a parar al Archivo de Internet:
Expediente Royuela: Bibliografía https://web.archive.org/web/20211229200542/https://hcommons.org/deposits/objects/hc:43750/datastreams/CONTENT/content?download=true
—oOo—
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