sábado, 28 de febrero de 2015

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 Blog de notas de José Angel García Landa (Biescas Zaragoza) - Febrero de 2015

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"Dido and Aeneas" - Accademia degli Astrusi

   



Y aquí la versión de Ricercar Consort

viernes, 27 de febrero de 2015

Panorámica de los panoramas

O: el panóptico en panóptico.

He estado en la tercera de las interesantísimas conferencias de Agustín Sánchez Vidal, "Genealogías de la mirada", sobre tecnología, perspectiva y artes visuales en la modernidad temprana. Aquí puede verse una panorámica del ciclo. La anterior conferencia iba sobre el mundo nuevo, los dioramas y otros artilugios de falsa perspectiva antes del cine; la conferencia de hoy iba sobre los panoramas, en el sentido original del término, por ejemplo el colosal globo de Wyld en Leicester Square.  Los panoramas como espectáculo de masas precedieron a los cines, y se extinguieron como los dinosaurios. Aunque alguno queda traspapelado.


great globe



Los panoramas los ha asociado Sánchez Vidal no sólo al desarrollo de la tecnología visual y de la arquitectura moderna (de vigas de acero, cristal, etc.) sino también al imperialismo y al deseo de obtener una visión global sobre el mundo y los imperios desde una alta perspectiva dominante. Una topsight a la vez literal y metafórica, vamos.  (Sobre esta cuestión de la perspectiva dominante o topsight he escrito diversas cosas, pero para qué andarse con chiquitas, vayamos directamente a esta que habla de total topsight).  También ha salido a colación, cómo no, el panóptico de Bentham, ese arquetipo de la visibilidad racional convertida en pesadilla totalitaria.

A mí me sugerían estas imágenes panorámicas y estas tecnologías el punto de vista que otro desarrollo paralelo a esta tecnología de los panoramas es la compleja escenografía teatral del XVIII y del XIX, y su afición por la magnificencia y las falsas perspectivas ilusionistas, con transición entre la realidad y la pintura.  Por ejemplo puede leerse aquí sobre el tipo de escenografía propuesta por Henry Irving y Beerbohm Tree en la segunda mitad del XIX.

 Es una cuestión ésta que viene de más lejos, claro, como puede verse en los diseños escénicos de las mascaradas y de las primeras óperas en el siglo XVIII. Aquí se ve una versión modernizada, en homenaje a ese tipo de escenografía, en Dido y Eneas de Purcell, por Le Poème Harmonique:





Ha mencionado Sánchez Vidal, como analogía más reciente de estas cuestiones, Google Street View. Y en una pregunta-comentario al final de la confrencia he redundado en ello, especulando que esta tecnología del parorama cada vez más inclusivo ha ido a derivar hacia el tratamiento informático de la visión, y la globalización de la Red. Google Earth, Google Maps, y Google en general son a la vez el espectáculo del panorama global, a tamaño mundial, y con la información centralizada a escala planetaria, combinando satélites, ordenadores, e fotografía e información geolocalizada. Google Maps o Google Earth son el panorama final, en el que convergen no sólo las imágenes sino todo tipo de información—texto, comentario, interacción de los espectadores...  Y Google en su conjunto (o Google como metonimia de Internet) es el gran Ojo Panóptico de la información mundial—en imágenes, en vídeo, en texto y en mapa del planeta, a regular Googlebot indeed, striding the world like a Colossus.

Google es un panóptico, pero también un panorama ilusionista o panóptico invertido—nos da la ilusión de ver, a veces muy vívida y hasta real, qué duda cabe—pero nos oculta el reverso de esa información recibida, que es la que enviamos nosotros. A Google le pagamos en datos, decía hoy Ana Gascón en su conferencia sobre protección de datos en el congreso de Japón y el Individuo. Creemos que vemos "con" Google, pero Google nos ve a nosotros de una manera mucho más eficaz (como el Gran Hermano, vuelto a invertir y reconvertido de espectáculo panóptico para masas al espía dentro de casa—delante de ti, hypocrite lecteur).

Podría servir perfectamente como emblema de Google Earth como Panorama Panóptico Universal, o del Google Eye que nos observa y nos espera, la imagen de Odilon Redon elegida por Sánchez Vidal para ilustrar la conferencia de hoy, "Ojo globo":


ojo globo


Otra línea de reflexión apuntada por Sánchez Vidal en la conferencia de hoy, y que nos lleva a la Perspectiva Total por otra vía.

Ha mencionado la teoría de la evolución de Darwin como una teoría en cierto modo también panóptica, proporcionando un nuevo paradigma totalizador, y a la vez asociada al desarrollo imperial de la visión global—posibilitada tanto por el viaje cartográfico y de reconocimiento del Beagle, como por la centralización de especímenes biológicos en el invernadero de Kew Gardens—otro edificio por cierto de acero y cristal, que prefigura toda la arquitectura moderna ya a mediados del XIX.

Bien, pues podemos añadir que la teoría de la evolución tal como la formulan Darwin, Spencer y sus contemporáneos, y también tal como la formulan los actuales proponentes de la Big History, del evolucionismo cosmológico, sirve como un punto de vista global que unifica espacio y tiempo. Junta todos los espacios y ordena todos los tiempos en un proceso unificado global, perceptible y comprensible desde la topsight del pensador evolucionista, una atalaya perspectivística que ofrece un panorama panóptico sobre la realidad—sobre todos los objetos reales y sus historias y génesis, y también sobre todos los objetos imaginarios que han generado las ideologías y sueños de la razón de los hombres.

Es una gran perspectiva narrativa, la historia de todo, a la que estamos anclados—lo queramos o no, lo sepamos o no.







—oOo—

Ser o estar, ésa es la cuestión

Hacia un saber sobre el alma: Lo que nos es dado pensar


 Un artículo sobre el alma, la interpretación y la comunicación, que menda cuelga en varios repositorios y revistas, empezando por Ibercampus y  SSRN. No llegamos a un saber completo sobre el alma, pero algo de terreno avanzamos.


Comentamos el texto de María Zambrano 'Hacia un saber sobre el alma' poniéndolo en el contexto de la hermenéutica de la retrospección y de la teoría desconstructivista de la comprensión. Una vez que definimos el alma de modo no transcendente sino semiótico, como sujeto de conocimiento que es objeto de conocimiento, el saber sobre el alma no puede desligarse del problema de la interpretación textual y de su desarrollo dialéctico.agora






English abstract:

Towards a Knowledge of the Soul: What is Possible for Us to Think

A commentary of María Zambrano's text "Towards a Knowledge of the Soul", situating it within the context of the hermeneutics of retrospection and the deconstructivist theory of understanding. Once the soul is given a non-transcendental but a semiotic definition, as a subject of understanding which is an object of understanding, knowledge of the soul cannot be disentangled from the problems of textual interpretation and its dialectical development.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish

 
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: Hermeneutics, Interpretation, Deconstruction, Soul, Expression, Understanding, Philosophy, Zambrano

Reference Info: Ibercampus (April 5, 2011)

Date posted: February 20, 2015  

http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2567612



eJournal Classifications
LIT Subject Matter eJournals
    
PRN Subject Matter eJournals
    
        
PRN Subject Matter eJournals
    
        





_____. "Hacia un saber sobre el alma." Academia 21 Aug. 2016.*
         2016
_____. "Hacia un saber sobre el alma." ResearchGate 21 Aug. 2016.*
         2016


Japón y el Individuo

miércoles, 25 de febrero de 2015

Annotations on V. N. Voloshinov's 'Marxism and the Philosophy of Language'

 
Abstract:     

Critical annotations on V. N. Voloshinov's study "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" (1929), on topics such as reflexion vs. refraction, consciousness and signs, language and ideology, Saussurean structuralism, verbal interaction, and theme vs. meaning.



Also in

- Net Sight de José Angel García Landa


_____. "Annotations on V. N. Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language." Academia 28 August 2013.*

_____. "Annotations on V. N. Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language." ResearchGate 23 Feb. 2015.*




B) Notes from some chapters of the book (taken in 1988)




1. The Study of Ideologies and Philosophy of Language

The Marxist theory of ideologies is bound up with problems of the philosophy of language. Everything ideological is a sign; "Without signs there is no ideology." Physical bodies may be converted into signs and thus they become ideological products: they reflect and refract another reality. The world of signs vs. the world of natural phenomena. 

11- "Every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow of reality, but is also itself a material segment of that very reality." This is a fact neglected by idealism and by psychologism.  "Consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs." Consciousness as a semiotic process: translating a sign into another one: "And nowhere is there a break in the chain, nowhere does the chain plunge into inner being, nonmaterial in nature and unembodied in signs."  This chain emerges in interaction between individuals: consciousness is social. Ideology cannot be studied as individual consciousness (idealism seeks supernatural causes; psychologism seeks subhuman ones: both disregard human society).

12- "The individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact."  Consciousness cannot be derived directly from nature, nor ideology from consciousness. [Cf. Croce's notion of intuition as expression—JAGL].

13- "The study of ideologies does not depend on psychology to any extent and need not be grounded in it." The reality of social signs is directly determined by the total aggregate of social and economic laws. "Ideological reality is the immediate superstructure over the economic basis"—and it is not constructed by individual consciousness, who is only a tenant in the edifice. Ideological phenomena are linked rather with conditions and forms of social communication. E. g. language: "The word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence"— the entire reality of the word is absorbed in its function of being a sign; it reveals best the basic forms of semiology. [Cf. Saussure]. The word is a natural sign, not specialised in any ideological function.  But conversational language is an area of behavioral ideology.

14- The word also becomes "the semiotic material of inner life-consciousness (inner speech)." The material is pliable and accessible to the individual.

15- That is why "the word functions as an essential ingredient accompanying all ideological creativity whatsoever" (although none of the fundamental, specific ideological signs is wholly replaceable by words). The word influences any other ideological refraction. The word is the fundamental object of the Marxist study of ideologies.


2. Concerning the relationship of the Basis and Superstructures

Mechanical causality is inadmissible in the study of ideologies. No connection between isolated facts in the basis and ideological superstructures is valid—the fact torn from its ideological context [i.e. its structural relationships, cf. the Saussurean notion of structure—JAGL] is meaningless. The "dialectical generation of society (...) emerges from the basis and comes to completion in the superstructures." E.g., new characters appear in a novel not because of some social change, but because that social change has changed the structure of literature, of "the whole novel, as a single organic unity subject to its own specific laws." The word is the most sensitive index of social changes due to its ubiquity (—even of those not yet defined).

Plexanov's "social psychology" is in fact the process of verbal communication and interaction. There is nothing inner in it. Production relations determine the forms of verbal communication. There is a need for a typology of material forms of expression, in order to understand how ideologies arise, in different periods and social groups, and which themes arise.

21- Form: "the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction." But the contents of signs are also shaped by social interaction.

22- "Only that which has acquired social value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there." The themes, and also the "individual" accents of consciousness, are also interindividual.

23- "Existence reflected in signs is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of exixtence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i. e. by the class struggle.  Social multiaccentuality preserves the dynamic force of signs. There are also "dead" signs, withdrawn from the arena of ideological confrontation. The inner dialectic quality of the sign appears clearly in times of social crisis.



PART II

1. Two Trends of thought in Philosophy of Language

—i.e. individualistic subjectivism vs. abstract objectivism.

The actual mode of existence of language is a problem—vs. superficial phonetic empiricism, etc.: language is not the sum of two different psychophysiological processes (in individual speaker and hearer). It must be studied in social intercourse (in social milieux and immediate social events of communication). There are two basic trends in the philosophy of language respecting the identification and delimitation of language as an object of study.

Individualistic subjectivism considers the act of speech, individual and creative, as the basis of language (and likewise of art). Language is conceived as energeia;  the laws of its creativity are the laws of individual psychology. Language as system (ergon) is the hardened lava of individual creativity.

- This conception goes from Humboldt to Potebnja [Voloshinov does not mention Vico in this respect.] Steinthal too, in a more limited way. Wundt is similar, but in the language of positivism. in the final analysis, all the explanations of myth, language and religion are psychological.

- Vossler—positivistic again—rejects sticking to form and foregrounds meaningful ideological factors. But he rejects social and political facts to a "linguistic taste." The basic reality of language here is not a system but the individual creative act of speech (Sprache als Rede).

51- "everything that becomes a fact of grammar had once been a fact of style"; there is a "Precedence of style over grammar." Studies are on the border between linguistics and stylistics.

- Croce: language as expression; it is individual.

Abstract objectivism. For this trend, the specific object of the science of language is not speech acts but (52) "the linguistic system as a system of the phonetic, grammatical and lexical forms of language." The acts are idiosyncratic, but the system ensures unity and comprehension. There is a normative identity, vs. the individual variation. The system is acquired ready-made by the individual. The individual act becomes a linguistic act only because of the compliance with the system. The system has an immanent and specific nature, not reducible to any other set of laws.

54- "This specifically linguistic systematicity, in distinction from the systematicity of ideology (...) cannot become a motive for the individual consciousness."  It is not a matter of "taste", but of arbitrary correctness. This trend assumes a discontinuity between the history of language and the system of language.

Here it is at odds with the first trend; for abstract objectivists, history and language change are irrational, while the system is coherent. For individualistic subjectivists, it was the generation of language (a historical process) which ensured its reality. In Vossler,

56- "linguistic taste creates the unity of a language at any given moment in time; and it is the same linguistic taste that creates and secures the unity of a language's historical evolution."

The transition from one form to another is unconscious for abstract objectivists, deliberate for individualist subjectivists; the system is the essence of language for abstract objectivists, and it is dross for individualist subjectivists. The principles of these trends are antithetical.

The roots of abstract objectivism go back to Descartes and rationalism. The interest lies not in the relation between sign and reality, but in the relation of sign to sign in the system—the inner logic of the system.

58- "Rationalists are not averse to taking the understander's viewpoint into account, but are least of all inclined to consider that of the speaker, as the subject expressing his own inner life." They use mathematical analogies; the French eighteenth-century is their ideal ground, but Saussure is the leading theorist. This school has been influential in Russia (against Vossler). For Saussure, langage and parole are not fit for study—only langue, the system. The main thesis is the correlation
language : utterance  =  social : individual
—because they present the utterance as being entirely individual!  The utterance, the individual element, is an essential factor in a history of language; history is seen as an irrational force disturbing the logic of the system.

The rest of schools effect a compromise between both positions (Neogrammarians are closer to objectivism; the fact as an ultimate criterion, laws of sound, etc.). There is a rejection of responsible philosophy.


2. Language, Speech, and Utterance (Analysis of abstract objectivism).

Language is conceived as system. Can it be considered a real entity? Not for the representatives of abstract objectivism. The system is an "objective fact external to and independent of any individual consciousness." But from a truly objective viewpoint language appears as endless becoming, not as fixed system.

66- "Thus a synchronic system, from the objective point of view, does not correspond to any real moment in the historical process of becoming."  Any system of social norms exists only for the individual consciousness—and this relationship is itself an objective fact. [Note that Saussure's point of view as a subject, and as a linguist, is relevant here too, if we follow this reasoning. — JAGL.] This results in an hypostasizing abstract objectivism—or else an ambiguous use of the world "objective" (meaning either "objective from the standpoint of the subjectivity of the speaker" or "from the objective standopoint" (Saussure is ambiguous here).

But not even the subjective consciousness of the speaker conceives of language as a system of normatively identical forms. For the speaker the point of attention is not the identity of the form, but rather its new value in a particular context. Similar for the hearer: it is not a matter of recognizing the identity of the form; an attention (68) "to understanding its novelty and not to recognizing its identity" [One might emphasize that the one goes along with the other. And users of language are often angered by breaches of linguistic norms.—JAGL]. Linguistic forms are not a fixed signal, but an adaptable sign. Signals are recognized; signs are understood. The signal is not ideological, but merely technical. Any act of understanding is already a response: it translates what is being understood into a new context from which a response can be made.

Signalization is present in language, but is dialectically effaced by the new quality of the sign (i.e. of language as such). It is present in a second language: (69) "The ideal of mastering a language is absorption of signality by pure semioticity and of recognition by pure understanding." (In concrete contexts, etc.). The linguistic consciousness of the speaker is not concerned with abstract normative system, (70) "but with language-speech in the sense of the aggregate of possible contexts of usage for a particular linguistic form." We do not hear "words": (70) "Words are always filled with content and meaning drawn from behavior or ideology." The criterion of correctness is only applied abnormally—it is usually submerged by a purely ideological criterion.

70- "Language, in the process of its practical implementation, is inseparable from its ideological or behavioral impletion". But it is divorced from it by abstract objectivism, which is a serious error. The system is obtained by abstraction for a practical end: the focus of attention has been the study of defunct, alien languages preserved in written monuments—a philological orientation. Throughout all history, (71) "Linguistics makes its appearance wherever and whenever philological need has appeared"—a matter of necessity, but it is inadequate for dealing with living speech; it lacks range. But even the written monument is an inseverable element of verbal communication—it is caught in the chain of performance:

72- "Each monument carries on the work of its predecessors, polemicizing with them, expecting active, reponsive understanding and anticipating such understanding in return." A work is part of science, of literature, or of political life; and it is (72) "perceived in the generative process of that particular ideological domain of which it is an integral part." But it is viewed by the philologic linguist as an isolated entity.

73- "Inevitably, the philologist linguist's passive understanding is projected onto the very monument he is studying from the language point of view, as if that monument were in fact calculated for just that kind of understanding, as if it had, in fact, been written for the philologist." A false notion of passive understanding permeates all. The heuristic and pedagogical tasks of linguistics deform the understanding of the work. The philologist is always a decipherer of secrets, and a teacher —like the priests. The whole is permeated by a philosophy of the Word, of the alien word. Foreign language spell-bounds linguistic study. With the conqueror-chief, "incipit philosophia, incipit philologia."

Importance of the alien, foreign language word in history (it determines a magical conception of the word). Linguistics is a product of the foreign word; but it does not understand the role the foreign word has played in it. Japhetic linguistics, and multitribal languages—emerging from tribal names!  A cognizance of the alien word and its assumptions determines the way abstract objectivism conceives of language at large.

77- "1. The factor of stable self-identity in linguistic forms takes precedence over their mutability"—etc. Reification of language, a jump from elements to the whole—decontextualization.

81- "people do not 'accept' their native language—it is in their native language that they first reach awareness." There is no possibility of linguistic responsibility if the system is just accepted (etc.).  The truth of language is to be found in the dialectical synthesis of individual subjectivitism and abstract objectivism.

The utterance is not individual (something which both individual subjectivism and abstract objectivism had assumed, and this is their weak point):

82- "The utterance is a social phenomenon."

3. Verbal interaction

(Analysis of individualistic subjectivism, and synthesis of both trends).

Individualistic subjectivism is associated with romanticism (opposing rationalism and classicism). Romanticism as a reaction against the alien word and against the last resurgences of the cultural power of the alien word. The romantics were the first philologists of the native language. But this conception is also based on the monologic utterance—conceived from the inside, from the person speaking. Speech appears as expression: something defined in the mind of the individual, and objectified for others with signs. The expressible exists apart from expression; there is a switching of form. They presuppose a dualism, inside/outside, with a primacy for the inside, deformed in expression.

This is untenable. The inside and the outside are made of the same material. And, (85) "It is not experience that organizes expression, but the other way around—expression organizes experience". The word is oriented to the addressee (that was ignored); and it appears in a specific social situation, even if it is only the social purview of our group. The inner world of the individual contains a social audience. 

86- "A word is territory shared by both addresser and addressee"; "The immediate social situation and the broader social milieu wholly determine—and determine from within, so to speak—the structure of an utterance."  The speaker controls the production of the signal, but not of the sign. (87) "The degree to which an experience is perceptible, distinct, and formulated is directly proportional to the degree to which it is socially oriented" —it is not a blur in the soul, etc. [Cf. Croce.—JAGL]

2 poles: I-experience and We-experience (indifferentiation vs. differentiation).

Collective experience in a materially aligned group is the most favourable ground for achieving ideological clarity and structuredness. Individualistic self-experience is not the same as the I-experience: it is perfectly structured.

89- "individualism is a special ideological form of the 'we-experience' of the bourgeois class." Self-confidence is not drawn from the inside, but from society. "But there resides in this type of individualistic 'we-experience', and also in the very order to which it corresponds, an inner contradiction that sooner or later will demolish its ideological structuredness."

90- "Outside objectification, outside embodiment in some particular material (...) consciousness is a fiction."  Consciousness as material expression is an objective fact and social force, (90) "capable even of exerting in turn an influence on the economic bases of social life."

91- "Behavioral ideology is that atmosphere of unsystematized and unfixed inner and outer speech which endows our every instance of behavior and action and our every 'conscious' state with meaning" (comparable to the "social psychology" in Marxism). (91) "The established ideological systems of social ethics, science, art, and religion are crystallizations of behavioral ideology, and these crystallizations, in turn, exert a powerful influence back upon behavioral ideology, normally setting its tone"—and providing vital contact at the same time. The work is illuminated anew by the consciousness of the perceiver: it gains new sustenance from the ideology of each age.

There are several strata in behavioral ideology (with a different definition, orientation, amplitude). They range from fleeting thoughts to strata linked with ideological systems and which can modify the economic basis. Creative individuality is a firmly grounded social orientation. Biographical explanations are interesting in the lower strata, but useless in the upper ones: the social being is all-important there. Individualistic subjectivism is correct in valuing the individual utterance and in not severing the linguistic form and the ideological impletion. But it is wrong in deriving both (ideology and subjectivism) from the individual psyche.

Conclusion:

94- "The actual reality of language-speech is not the abstract system of linguistic froms, not the isolated monologic utterance, and not the psychopathological act of its implementation, but the social event of verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or utterances." The same applies to printed verbal performances. [Cf. the "Discourse" section of Acción, Relato, Discurso— JAGL.]

95- "Any utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in and of itself, is only a moment in the continuous process of verbal communication." "Verbal communication can never be understood and explained outside of this connection with a concrete situation." The study of language should follow the steps of its actual generation: from particular utterances, to the forms of utterance, to language forms. The particular utterance is only an island in the continous sea of discourse. Social circles determine the types of utterance used. Rhetoric and poetics should be used to study the ideological utterance:

98- "1. Language as a stable system of identical forms is merely a scientific abstraction (..)

2. Language is a continuous generative process implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers.

3. The laws of the generative process of language are not at all the laws of individual psychology, but neither can they be divorced from the activity of speakers. (...)

4. Linguistic creativity does not coincide with artistic creativity nor with any other type of specialized ideological creativity. But, at the same time, linguistic creativity cannot be understood apart from the ideological meanings and values that fill it. (...)

5. The structure of the utterance is a pure sociological structure."

The notion of an individual speech act is a contradictio in adjecto.



4. Theme and Meaning in Language

The monologism of linguistics is revealed in the analysis of meaning (conceived as passive understanding). The significance of an utterance is its theme. Individual, irreproducible, determined by linguistic forms and by extraverbal situation.

100- "Only an utterance taken in its full, concrete scope as an historical phenomenon, possesses a theme."  "Meaning" consists of the reproducible aspects of the utterance (abstract); "Meaning is the technical apparatus for the implementation of theme." There is no clear boundary—but a dialectical dependence from one another. Voloshinov alludes to Marr's theory of the origin of language starting from a one-word utterance containing all significance, i.e. being all theme.  OK in the sense that

101- "Multiplicity of meanings is the constitutive feature of word." Marr's one-word language ia all theme, but there is no meaning that one word. Theme is the upper limit of linguistic signifincance; meaning is the lower limit.

Voloshinov rejects the opposition of "usual" vs. "occasional" meanings, or of "denotation" vs. "connotation", etc. —There is a tendency in such discriminations to ascribe greater value to a central core of meaning, presupposing it is stable. And this analysis would leave theme unaccounted for. Cf. the problem of active understanding:

102- "To understand another person's utterance means to orient oneself with respect to it, to find the proper place for it in the corresponding context." "Any true understanding is dialogic in nature." (—except in the case of the understanding a foreign language). [Note the danger of using "dialogic" in this sense, when some extra element must be added to characterize actual dialogue.—JAGL]

Meaning does not belong to the word, but to a word in its position beween speakers. Meaning is realized only in active and responsive understanding.

102-3- "Meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound complex." The word is always linked in actual speech with a specific evaluative accent. The actual intonation is only a vehicle for this intonation (e.g. swearwords can have many meanings). Intonation is used to convey this evaluation only in familiar speech; public speech uses other evaluative devices. It is this evaluation that plays the active role in changes of meaning, and in the generation of themes.

The expansion of man's interests from primitive times is reflected in the generation of new semantic properties in language.


(...)







—oOo—





Que el mundo es uno y no muchos

Que el mundo es uno y no muchos

martes, 24 de febrero de 2015

Mensaje del Rectorado sobre huelga y piquetes

Como en ocasiones anteriores (dos o tres huelgas por año) recibimos los profesores de la Universidad de Zaragoza este mensaje del Vicerrector:


Estimados compañeros:

El próximo día 26 de febrero está convocada una huelga de estudiantes. Como en otras ocasiones, es previsible que a lo largo de la jornada hagan acto de presencia piquetes informativos a la entrada de las facultades y en las mismas aulas.

Se hará lo posible por garantizar el derecho de los miembros de la comunidad universitaria de acudir al trabajo y a las aulas, si así lo desean. No obstante, vemos necesaria la participación del personal docente e investigador para que la jornada discurra con normalidad. Para ello lanzamos una serie de recomendaciones:

* Es posible que el tráfico rodado se vea afectado en el Campus de Plaza San Francisco. Se recomienda valorar medios alternativos al coche particular para acceder a este Campus.

* Ante la presencia de piquetes informativos en los accesos a las facultades, es necesario actuar con calma y normalidad, en el caso de que no se participe de los argumentos esgrimidos, se recomienda evitar enfrentamientos inútiles.

* Cabe la posibilidad de que se produzcan interrupciones durante la impartición de alguna clase debido a que los piquetes informativos visiten el aula. Dado lo breve de estas intervenciones, es recomendable no poner impedimentos y realizar una pausa en vuestra labor docente.

Agradeciendo tu colaboración recibe un cordial saludo.


Por si no se entiende el mensaje voy a traducirlo un poquillo—es que hace falta contexto.

El próximo día 26 de febrero está convocada una huelga de estudiantes.

La huelga de estudiantes la convocan unos sindicatos que son sufridos  por los estudiantes, que no les votan y se limitan a sobrellevarlos. Los estudiantes, me refiero al noventa y cinco por ciento de ellos, no van a la universidad a votar sindicatos, sino a estudiar. Pero el cinco por ciento de concienciados los votan—y ahí están, apropiándose de la representación de todos y hablando en su nombre. Estos sindicatos son además muy atendidos y obedecidos por el Rectorado en sus comunicados. Cierran el campus siempre que quieren, con el beneplácito o gesto mohíno del Rectorado que les deja hacer, y sólo tolera la intervención de la Policía cuando pasan a agredir a la gente directamente. La huelga está convocada, sí, pero está convocada por encima de las cabezas de los estudiantes, por ciertos agentes de los partidos políticos.

Como en otras ocasiones, es previsible que a lo largo de la jornada hagan acto de presencia piquetes informativos a la entrada de las facultades y en las mismas aulas.

Acepta el Rectorado la mayor, llamando a los piquetes informativos en vez de lo que son: intimidatorios, coactivos y abusivos. Para informarme ya tengo Internet, gracias. Pero no se trata de eso, en absoluto.  El Rectorado ve previsible (como queda claro) que no se respetará el derecho al trabajo, pero no tiene la intención de hacer nada por cambiar esta situación.

Se hará lo posible por garantizar el derecho de los miembros de la comunidad universitaria de acudir al trabajo y a las aulas, si así lo desean.

Gustos hay para todo. Pero lo posible por garantizar ese derecho no se hará. Por ejemplo, anunciar que se mantendrá la puerta del campus abierta al tráfico rodado y que se garantizarápiquete informativo el acceso normal al campus sin sufrir intimidación ni violencia. O que se dejará actuar a la policía con normalidad— sin más. Eso no se ha hecho nunca en esta Universidad, ni se va a hacer.

No obstante, vemos necesaria la participación del personal docente e investigador para que la jornada discurra con normalidad.

Traduzco: Se dejen ustedes coaccionar, que es lo que toca hoy. Colaboren, señoras y caballeros. Normalidad en esta jornada es que no les permitan a ustedes trabajar con normalidad—así que a callar y a quedarse en casa, mucho mejor que protestar por sus derechos. O súmense a la huelga, oigan, total es contra el PP, qué más da que les estén atropellando sus derechos en primera persona, no es fascismo cuando lo hacemos nosotros.

Para ello lanzamos una serie de recomendaciones:


* Es posible que el tráfico rodado se vea afectado en el Campus de Plaza San Francisco.

Hombre, el Centro Simbólico. Que a los cejijuntos aún no se les ha ocurrido que podrían concentrar sus esfuerzos en bloquear Veterinaria un día.  A ver, no es posible. Es seguro que se va a ver "afectado" el tráfico, porque van a cerrar la verja del campus, con el beneplácito o autorización del Rectorado. Y llamas a Seguridad, como hago yo a veces, y te dicen: Ya sabemos que está cerrada. —¿Y tienen ustedes instrucciones de no abrirla? —No le puedo decir. —¿Podría hablar con el responsable de Seguridad? —En este momento no está localizable. Y así va el asunto una vez sí y otra también. En lugar de garantizar a la comunidad universitaria que esa entrada va a estar abierta como todos los días, para que haga huelga el que quiera, y el que no quiera no la haga.

Yo sé que paso por idiota, comentando lo obvio, o preguntando lo obvio, pero es que en esta universidad, y en todas por lo que entiendo, hay una hipocresía apestosa con esta cuestión de las huelgas y piquetes. Aquí queda bien demostrado que somos carne de fascismo, o de comunismo, que me da lo mismo. Y que vamos a ir a toque de silbato a la menor ocasión que se nos dé. Pero todo con un discurso muy políticamente correcto, eso sí, con mucha opción aparente.

Se recomienda valorar medios alternativos al coche particular para acceder a este Campus.

Y se recomienda escalar tapias en su caso, o llevar impermeable para los escupitajos. Sobre todo si eres de Derecho, que los Cejijuntos les tienen una querencia especial a los de Derecho, y ahí están con sus capuchas y sus palos y banderas de la estrella roja y pañuelos palestinos y camisetas del Che, imponiendo la "vaga" (que la llaman aquí en las pintadas). Otras veces, empero, es la "vada". Cuando ellos mismos la llaman huelga, y aragonés no hablaba ni su abuelo. Pero es que son así de falsos, es que apesta todo a un kilómetro.

* Ante la presencia de piquetes informativos en los accesos a las facultades, es necesario actuar con calma y normalidad, en el caso de que no se participe de los argumentos esgrimidos, se recomienda evitar enfrentamientos inútiles.

Según esta retórica rectoral, los piquetes son informativos, serviciales incluso, y dados al debate intelectual.  Ellos actúan con calma y normalidad. Quien es posible que no actúe con calma y normalidad es el profesorado, algún airado, porque la mayoría ya sabemos que van a cooperar (quedándose en casa si es posible, o sumándose al piquete). Los piquetes esgrimen argumentos—es el profesorado, o el alumnado que insiste en no hacer huelga, el que al parecer no atiende a razones, y busca enzarzarse en argumentaciones inútiles y subir el tono del debate, en lugar de escuchar pacientemente al piquete y luego volverse a casa, convencido, —o pasar a su puesto de trabajo desoyendo las razones. Ah no, perdón, que el argumento que esgrimían era echarte de ahí a patadas.... es que no seguía bien yo el argumentario éste, y aún menos participo de él.

A la mierda, me canso de traducir. No sé ni para qué me molesto en reiterar lo obvio, que mandan los de la porra. Si la mayoría del personal hace huelga cuando se lo ordenan, y sin chistar, será porque le conviene. Si no, no votaríamos a estos representantes, ni les daríamos un puesto que no se merecen.





—oOo—


También lo cuento en Ibercampus.

Mi currículum 2015

Últimamente vengo colgando una copia de mi curríscribeculum actualizado cada año, por si a alguien le interesa consultarlo. Hay empujones.  Aquí está




 —que se me queda en 634 páginas, de momento. Cuando llegue a 666, el fin estará cerca.

Hay quien dice que incluyo demasiados enlaces; podría ser, es opinable. Lo que no es discutible, es que no los incluyo todos, porque iba a parecer demasiado redundante la cosa.




—oOo—


Margarethe von Trotta, 'Hannah Arendt'

Este artículo examina críticamente la película de Margarethe von Trotta sobre Hannah Arendt y el caso Eichmann (2012), centrándose en el tratamiento dado a la complicidad paradójica e involucramiento de Heidegger con el nazismo, y en la aceptación extrañamente incuestionada y en el blanqueo de la figura y el pensamiento de Heidegger por parte de Arendt.




Margarethe von Trotta's 'Hannah Arendt': An Unusual Film on a Woman Philosopher



English Abstract: This paper is a critical analysis of Margarethe von Trotta's 2012 film on Hannah Arendt and the Eichmann case, with a focus on its treatment of Heidegger's paradoxical complicity and involvement with Nazism, and on Hannah Arendt's strangely unquestioning acceptance and whitening of Heidegger's figure and thought.


Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: Heidegger, Philosophy, Politics, Nazism, Film, Margarethe von Trotta, Hannah Arendt, Complicity

Vanity Fea

Ibercampus (June 30, 2013)   



_____. "Margarethe von Trotta, Hannah Arendt." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 24 Feb. 2015.*
         2015
_____. "Margarethe von Trotta, Hannah Arendt: Rara película sobre filósofa." Academia 25 August 2016.*
         2016
_____. "Margarethe von Trotta, Hannah Arendt: Rara película sobre filósofa." ResearchGate 25 August 2016.*
         2016


____


PS: También interesará quizá esta conferencia de Jean-Luc Nancy, "La banalité de Heidegger", en un coloquio sobre "Heidegger y los judíos".



lunes, 23 de febrero de 2015

Oscars 2015 full show - Academy Awards 2015 full show HQ

Torres y puente de Las Fuentes

Torres y puente de las Fuentes

More on Unreliable Narration

Latest in the series "Narratologia: Perspectives on Narrative Theory", published by De Gruyter (Berlin, Munich and Boston), vols. 44 and 45, devoted to the issue of unreliability in narrative. Here are the tables of contents (one is a collection in English, the other a monograph in German).


Nünning, Vera, ed. Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (Narratologia, 44). Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015.* (Theoretical Issues and New Directions; Transgeneric and Intermedial Approaches; Interdisciplinary Perspectives on (Un)reliability).
Nünning, Vera. (Heidelberg). "Conceptualising (Un)reliable Narration and (Un)trustworthiness." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 1-30.*
Margolin, Uri (Alberta). "Theorising Narrative (Un)reliability: A Tentative Road Map." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 31-58.*
Altes, Liesbeth Korthals (Groningen). "What About the Default, or Interpretive Diversity? Some Reflections on Narrative (Un)reliability." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 59-82.*
Nüning, Vera. "Reconceptualising Fictional (Un)reliability and (Un)trustworthiness from a Multidisciplinary Perspective: Categories, Typology and Functions." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 83-108.*
Petterson, Bo (Helsinki). "Kinds of Unreliability in Fiction: Narratorial, Focal, Expositional and Combined." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 109-29*
Vogt, Robert. (Gießen). "Combining Possible-Worlds Theory and Cognitive Theory: Towards an Explanatory Model for Ironic-Unreliable Narration, Ironic-Unreliable Focalization, Ambigous-Unreliable and Alterated-Unreliable Narration in Literary Fiction." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 131-53.*
Martens, Gunther. (Ghent). "Unreliability in Non-Fiction: The Case of the Unreliable Addressee." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 155-70.*
Hühn, Peter. (Hamburg). "Unreliability in Lyric Poetry." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 173-87.*
Nünning, Ansgar, and Christiine Schwanecke. (Gießen). "The Performative Power of Unreliable Narration and Focalisation in Drama and Theatre: Conceptualising the Specificity of Dramatic Unreliability." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 189-219.*
Brütsch, Matthias. (Zurich) "Irony, Retroactivity, and Ambiguity: Three Kinds of 'Unreliable Narration' in Literature and Film." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 221-44.*
Kuhn, Markus. (Hamburg). "(Un)reliability in Fictional and Factual Audiovisual narratives on YouTube." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 245-71.*
Bietz, Chirstoph (Köln). "Tracing Televised 'Truth': Reality Effect and Unreliable Narration in TV News." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 273-302.*
Dernbach, Beatrice. (Nürnberg). "(Un)reliable Narration in Journalism: The Fine Line Between Journalism and Fiction." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 305-28.*
Elter, Andreas. (Köln). "Unreliable Narratives in the US Elections: How Much Reliability Can a Campaign Take?" In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 329-46.*
Arnauld, Andreas von, and Stefan Martini (Kiel). "Unreliable Narration in Law Courts." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 347-70.*
Jaeger, Stephan. (Manitoba). "Unreliable Narration in Historical Studies." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 371-93.*
Mildorf, Jarmila. (Paderborn). "Unreliability in Patient Narratives: From Clinical Assessment to Narrative Practice." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 395-413.*
Boothe, Brigitte, and Dragica Stojkovic. (Zurich). "Communicating Dreams: On the Struggle for Reliable Dream Reporting and the Unreliability of Dream Reports." In Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Ed. Vera Nünning. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 415-28.*


Ohme, Andreas. Skaz und Unreliable Narration: Entfurf einer neuen Typologie des Erzählers. (Narratologia, 45). Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015.*
Ohme, Andreas. "1. Einleitung." In Ohme, Skaz und Unreliable Narration: Entfurf einer neuen Typologie des Erzählers. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 1-6.*
Ohme, Andreas. "2. Zur Theorie des skaz." In Ohme, Skaz und Unreliable Narration: Entfurf einer neuen Typologie des Erzählers. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015.* (2.1 Boris Ejchenbaum; 2.2 Viktor Vinogradov; 2.3 Michail Bakhtin; 2.4 Irwin R. Titunik; 2.5 Die Erzählertypologie Lubomír Dolezels; 2.6 Mögliche Bestimmungkriterien für skaz ; 2.7 Rekapitulation und Schlussfolgerungen für das Konzept skaz)
Ohme, Andreas. "3. Zur Theorie von unreliable narration." In Ohme, Skaz und Unreliable Narration: Entfurf einer neuen Typologie des Erzählers. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 117-64.* (3.1 Das Problem der Instanz; 3.2 Das Problem des Gegenstands - Poe, Agatha Christie, Thomas Glavinic, Patrick McGrath, Kazuo Ishiguro, Salinger; 3.3 Das Problem des Maßstabs; 3.4 Die semantische Markierung)*
Ohme, Andreas. "4. Zusammenfassung." In Ohme, Skaz und Unreliable Narration: Entfurf einer neuen Typologie des Erzählers. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. 265-69.*



Note that Ohme's volume is devoted specifically to what Wayne Booth defined as narrative unreliability—a rhetorical technique in fiction which presupposes the use of a "silent" and reliable implied author, Nünning's volume, though, combines studies on this rhetorical technique with studies on unreliability in a wider sense—which may include unreliable authors or speakers, or unreliable communication generally, as it bears on narrative forms.



Made it to no. 3

Made It to Number 3

Mead sobre el gesto como símbolo

Muchos temas de interés toca George Herbert Mead en su libro Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist—que viene a ser el fundamento teórico del interaccionismo simbólico.  Aquí puede leerse algo más sobre los principios del interaccionismo simbólico

Una de las cuestiones teóricas centrales es relativa a la naturaleza simbólica del lenguaje humano, diferenciándolo de la comunicación animal, pues el lenguaje es por su propia naturaleza ya simbólico e interaccional. El lenguaje surge en un proceso de interacción social dialéctica, en el que una acción social, vocalización, gesto, etc., responde a otro de modo no automático, y da lugar a una respuesta diferente, que se retroalimenta de la reacción observada y de la respuesta obtenida.   De esta manera, no sólo las palabras, sino tambien los gestos humanos, tienen un sentido y estructura muy diferente a los gestos y sonidos de los animales. Y aquí reproduzco este pasaje donde comienza Mead a exponer su noción con una crítica al darwinismo.  Pero mi intención es relacionar esta cuestión con otra teoría del gesto, no precisamente darwinista, a la que volvemos luego.  El texto viene de la introducción de Mead al libro Mind, Self, and Society, "The point of view of social behaviorism".



One of the important documents in the history of modern psychology, particularly for the psychology of language, is Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Here Darwin carried over his theory of evolution into the field of what we call "conscious experience." What Darwin did was to show that there sas a whole series of acts or beginnings of acts which called out certain responses that do express emotions. If one animal attacks another, or is on the point of attacking, or of taking the bone of another dog, that action calls out violent responses whjich express the anger of a second dog. There we have a set of attitudes which express the emotional attitude of dogs; and we can carry this analysis into the human expression of emotion.

The part of our organism that most vividly and readily expresses the emotions is the face, and Darwin studied the face from this point of view. He took, naturally, the actor, the man whose business it is to express the emotions by the movements of the countenance, and studied the muscles themselves; and in studying them he undertook to show what the value of these changes of the face might be in the actual act. We speak of such expressions as those of anger, and note the way in which the blood may suffuse the face at one stage and then leave it at another. Darwin studied the blood flow in fear and in terror. In these emotions one can find changes taking place in the blood flow itself. These changes have their value. They represent, of course, changes in the circulation of blood in the acts. These actions are generally actions which are rapid and can only take place if the blood is flowing rapidly. There must be a change in the rhythm of circulation and this generally registers itself in the countenance.

Many of our acts of hostility exhibit themselves in attitudes of the face similar to animals who attack with their teeth. The attitude, or in a more generalized term, the gesture, has been preserved after the value of the act has disappeared. The title of Darwin's work indicates his point of approach. He was dealing with these gestures, these attitudes, as expressive of emotions and assuming at the time that the gesture has this furnction of expressing the emotions. That attitude has been preserved, on this view, after the value of the act has disappeared. This gesture seems to remain for the purpose of expressing emotions. One naturally assumed there an attitude in the experience of animals which answers in some sense to those of the human animal. One could apply the doctrine of the survival of the fittest here also. The implication in this particular case was that these gestures or attitudes had lost the value which they had in the original acts, and yet had survived. The indication was that they had survived because they served certain valuable functions, and the suggestion was that this was the expression of the emotions. That attitude on Darwin's part is reflected in the work of other psychologists, men who were interested, as Darwin was, in the study of the act, in the information that is conveyed by one individual to another by his attitude. They assume that these acts had a reason for existence because they expressed something in the mind of the individual. It is an approach like that of the philologist. They assume that language existed for the purpose of conveying certain ideas, certain feelings.

If one considers, he realizes that this is a false approach. It is quite impossible to assume that animals do undertake to express their emotions. They certainly do not undertake to express them for the benefit of other animals. The most that can be said is that the "expressions" did set free a certain emotion in the individual, an escape valve, so to speak, an emotional attitude which the animal needed, in some sense, to get rid of. They certainly could not exist in these lower animals as means of expressing emotions; we cannot approach them from the point of view of expressing a content in the mind of the individual. We can, of course, see how, for the actor, they may become definitely a language. An actor, for example, may undertake to express his rage, and he may do it by an expression of the countenance, and so convey to the audience the emotion he intended. However, he is not expressing his own emotion but simply conveying to the audience the evidence of anger, and if he is conveying to the audience the evidence of anger, and if he is successful he may doe it more effectively, as far as the audience is concerned, than a person who is in reality angered. There we have these gestures serving the purpose of expression of the emotions, but we cannot conceive that they arose as such a language in order to express emotion. Language, then, has to be studied from the point of view of the gestural type of conduct whithin which it existed without being as such a definite language. And we have to see how the communicative function could have arisen out of that prior sort of conduct.

The psychology of Darwin assumed that emotion was a psychological state, a state of consciousness, and that this state could not itself be formulated in terms of the attitude or the behavior of the form. It was assumed that the emotion is there and that certain movements might give evidence of it. The evidence would be received and acted upon by other forms that were fashioned like itself. That is, it presupposed the conscious state over against the biological organism. The conscious state was that which was to be expressed in the gesture or the attitude. It was to be expressed in behavior and to be recognized in some fashion as existent in the consciousness of the other form through this medium of expression. Such was the general psychological attitude whicvh Darwin accepted. danzarina

Contrary to Darwin, however, we find no evidence for the prior existence of consciousness as something which brings about behavior on the part of one organism that is of such a sort as to call forth an adjustive response on the part of another organism, without itself being dependent on such behavior. We are rather forced to conclude that consciousness is an emergent from such behavior; that so far from being a precondition of the social act, the social act is the precondition of it. The mechanism in the social act can be traced out without introducing into it the conception of consciousness as a separable element within the act; hence the social act, in its more elementary stages or forms, is possible without, or apart from some form of consciousness.  (Mind, Self, & Society 15-18).


La emergencia de la consciencia compleja se dará, para Mead, unida a las self-indications que se dirige el organismo a sí mismo, dividiéndose en varios roles interaccionales (interiorizados) y constituyendo así lo que es propiamente una mente humana.

Se trata de un continuo, ciertamente, pues si Mead arguye contra Darwin es precisamente para enfatizar la necesidad de una concepción todavía más evolucionista de la mente, una que la conciba realmente como fenómeno emergente a partir de la interacción social y no cometa la falacia retrospectivizante (hindsight bias, aunque Mead no utiliza el término) que comete Darwin al hablar de la "expresión" de los animales.  Cabe incluso, aun manteniendo la corrección de Mead en sus líneas generales, que Darwin tenga razón y que las mentes animales sean, en los animales más complejos y gesticulantes, más simbólicas de lo que se ha venido considerando, con un cierto despego ya entre el gesto como producto de los movimientos no reflexivos del animal, y el gesto como una modalidad de interacción comunicativa ya parcialmente simbolizada. Ciertamente no sólo las llamadas de los monos, y sus gestos faciales, sino los rugidos de los leones o los juegos de los perros tienen un valor simbólico complejo que parece claro, y que no vamos a comentar más (se lo dejamos a algún etólogo).  Y es que no sólo el hombre, sino todos estos animales son producto de la ecología de su interacción social tanto en sus cuerpos como en sus mentes. Es revelador el siguiente pasaje de Mead en tanto que revela una limitación de su perspectiva sobre la complejidad evolutiva que subyace a la mente humana, y animal. Habla de las limitaciones que podemos ascribir al concepto de imitación en el comportamiento humano y animal:

We argued that there is no evidence of any general tendency on the part of forms to imitate each other. If one attempts to state such a tendency it breaks down mechanically. It would mean that we have a tendency to do the same thing that other people are doing, and also that these tendencies are not only in our nature, but also that they are attached to certain specific stimuli which mean what the other people are doing. The sight of one person doing something would be a stimulus to another person to do the same thing. We should have to assume that what the person is doing is alreay a reaction that is in the nature of the imitating individual. It would mean that we have in our nature already all of these various activities, and that they are called out by the sight of other people doing the same thing. It is a perfectly impossible assumption.  (Mind, Self, & Society 58)

Bueno, está acreditado que bostezamos cuando alguien bosteza a nuestro lado—es más, que esto sucede en distintas especies de animales, pues parece ser un reflejo de cierta respetable antigüedad evolutiva. Más evolucionado quizá sea otro fenómeno que contradice palmariamente a Mead cuando cree que es ésta una "impossible assumption": las neuronas espejo, circuitos mentales que se activan en la mente de un espectador, asociados a una acción gestual o manipulativa, cuando ven esa acción realizada por otro sujeto. Se dan abundantemente en los monos y desde luego también en los seres humanos, y parecen ser una parte importante de nuestra cognición y de nuestra sociabilidad. La base neurológica de la intersubjetividad, me gusta a mí llamarlas. Estas neuronas muestran que está incorporada en nuestra percepción la sociabilidad, la respuesta a las acciones de los demás. Una respuesta que por cierto ayuda a procesar la acción del otro con los mismos circuitos cerebrales que realizarían la nuestra, haciéndola así más comprensible, más comprendida "des dentro"—pero es una respuesta que tiene que ir acompañada de su inhibición, porque en efecto (si exceptuamos casos patológicos) tiene razón Mead cuando dice que no tendemos a hacer lo que vemos hacer a los demás, al menos no automáticamente.... aunque, como vemos, en cierto modo sí tendemos, y a veces hasta lo hacemos.

Ver sobre esta cuestión un par de posts anteriores sobre las neuronas espejo y la intersubjetividad:


García Landa, José Ángel. "Neuronas espejo y visión… de la visión." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 14 April 2010.*
    http://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2010/04/neuronas-espejo-y-vision-de-la-vision.html
    2010
_____. "Redes de mentes conectadas." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 28 April 2010.* (Mirror neurons).
    http://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2010/04/redes-de-mentes-conectadas.html
    2010
_____. "Embodied Intersubjectivity." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 12 Jan. 2012.* (Vittorio Gallese, I. A. Richards, mirror neurons).
    http://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2012/01/embodied-intersubjectivity.html
    2012


O estos vídeos:


Punset, Eduard, et al. "Redes 56: Mentes conectadas sin brujería." Redes para la ciencia / Blip TV (Mirror neurons).
    http://www.redesparalaciencia.com/2644/redes/2010/redes-56-mentes-conectadas-sin-brujeria
    2010

Ramachandran, V. S. "The Neurons that Shaped Civilization." Videotalk at TED (Jan 2010).*
    http://www.ted.com/talks/vs_ramachandran_the_neurons_that_shaped_civilization.html
    2010


Pero pasando a otra cuestión, más allá del grado de evolución y simbolismo de las mentes animales, me interesa relacionar la discusión de Mead con un debate más antiguo sobre la naturaleza del teatro—aquél que formuló Diderot en su Paradoxe sur le Comédien y que venía a oponer la actuación "vivida" a la meramente "vívida", o los gestos auténticos y surgidos desde dentro frente al lenguaje convencionalizado y las pasiones expresivamente significadas—Stanislavsky contra Garrick, por así decirlo.  Esta polémica la formuló William Archer en la época victoriana como la oposición entre rostros y máscaras.

Tal como lo presenta Mead, el actor metódico del Actor's Studio se animaliza a sí mismo, y produce expresiones no simbólicas, mientras que un actor experimentado que domina su oficio sin vivir su personaje produce gestos simbólicos, quizá indistinguibles desde fuera y aparentemente expresión de una interioridad—pero más posiblemente bien discernibles como convención a una distancia determinada.

Queda la sospecha terrible, a la que invita también la psicología de Mead, de que la expresión humana auténtica esté tan filtrada por la convención y la significación que no tenga sentido realmente esta distinción. Que cuando Garrick expresa una pasión convencionalmente, no está tan lejano de un actor del Method que se convence a sí mismo (actuando incluso ante sí mismo, por así decirlo) de que está viviendo realmente ese personaje y esa emoción... aunque el espectador interno asiste en su asiento a ese drama interno, no decimos que no hasta cierto punto conmovido por la actuación.

En fin, quería presentar este debate en torno a Mead y a la emergencia de la consciencia como continuación del artículo que dediqué a la teoría dramática de Diderot en "Garrick, Shakespeare, y la paradoja del comediante."  Y quizá también ya puestos, quien quiera puede leer sobre la teoría dramatística de la conciencia en mi artículo sobre "Goffman: El teatro de la interioridad", y en "Interacción internalizada: El desarrollo especular del lenguaje y del orden simbólico."


Para más sobre actuación y neuronas espejo podemos oír este debate del Philoctetes Center:

Brown, Blair, Vittorio Gallese, et al. "Acting and Mirror Neurons." Round table discussion at the Philoctetes Center. YouTube (philoctetesctr) 29 Nov. 2007.*
    http://youtu.be/loB-Lg0X1qo
    2013



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